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AND THE OLDER WORKER:
WHO WILL REVIEW THE JUDGES?
By GEORGE W. ADAMS*
"They were trying to get rid of some of the old boys, and I just got caught in that.
Anyway, I'm keeping busy now." 1
This was Mr. L. V. Garvin's reaction to the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada quashing a labour arbitration award and thereby upholding
Bell Canada's right to retire him compulsorily.2 But what will happen to Mr.
Garvin now? Or at least, what may happen to persons of his age when other
companies use this right? He was 61 years old when retired, having worked for
Bell Canada for almost 36 years. No one had suggested that he was too old or
physically unable to carry on his work. Rather, he was deprived of his job
because in 1917 the company unilaterally instituted a pension plan. The com-
pany was to make all the payments into the plan provided that all male
employees who reached the age of 60 and who had worked 20 years or more
for Bell "may, at the discretion of the Committee, be retired from active service
and shall thereupon become entitled to and shall be granted pensions, which
pensions are designated as 'service pensions'." It is important to note that the
pension plan had not been negotiated with the union that was later certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent of Bell's employees, and for that reason the plan
was not part of the collective agreement. Accordingly, it remained a plan both
unilaterally introduced and unilaterally maintained by the company. Now
retired, how will Garvin provide for himself and family? What kinds of employ-
ment opportunities are open to him should he want to re-enter the work force?
How long can one keep busy, remaining satisfied with the residual role assigned
to the retired worker in today's society? In answering these questions, a brief
outline of the socio-economic and psychological plight of the retired worker,
and more generally the aged, will serve to emphasize both the importance of
the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada and the questionable merits of
this so-called legal right to retire a worker without his consent.
There are some 800,000 people in Ontario alone who are 65 years of age
or older, and approximately 1.8 million throughout Canada.3 Moreover, this
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 Toronto Star, July 11, 1973.
Bell Canada v. Office and Professional Employees' Inter'l Union, Loc. 131 (1973),
73 C.L.L.C. para. 14, 170, 37 D.L.R. (3d) 561; [1972] 2 O.R. 595, 26 D.L.R. (3d)
263 (C.A.).
2The award, Bell Canada and Office and Professional Employees' Inter'l Union,
Loc. 131 (May 14, 1971 - Prof. P. Weiler) has gone unreported. However, it can
be found in the new edition of Labour Relations Law: Cases, Materials, and Com-
mentary compiled by the Labour Relations Casebook Group (1974).
3 Target for Senior Citizens, Task Force on Senior Citizens, sponsored by the On-
tario Federation of Labour (1973), at 1 and 14.
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age category is increasing at the rate of 100 people per day.4 It is reported that
more than 90% of these people are not physically or mentally incapacitated
to the extent that they must be taken into care.5
In 1961, 54% of this age category had gross annual money incomes of
less than $1,000.6 More specifically, 570,000 unattached persons in this cate-
gory had a medium income of $829. Of these 570,000 people, 40% lived with
married children, and the remainder, some 267,000 people, lived alone. Statis-
tics compiled by the Federal Department of Health and Welfare up to March
1973 indicate that of 1,808,233 pensioners in Canada, 1,045,467 received a
Guaranteed Income Supplement, a program instituted in 1967 to replace the
former old age assistance scheme, and intended to bring pensioners close to
the poverty line.7
Of course, Garvin may be better off than many of these people because
he is party to the Bell's pension scheme. But with today's ravaging inflation,
few pension plans will provide retired workers with an adequate post retirement
income. More importantly, there is no law in Canada requiring companies to
provide pension schemes no matter how inadequate, and in 1972 only 40%
of the Canadian work force was covered by private plans.8 As a consequence
of this economic setting in modem society, 'old and poor' has become almost
a tautology.9
It was this kind of economic reality facing the retired worker that led the
Special Committee of the Senate on Aging in 1966 to conclude:
To sum up, the Committee, while recognizing and regretting the gaps and differences
in existing knowledge about the income status of older people, is fully persuaded on
the basis of the evidence presented to it and its own analysis of available data, that
4 The Globe and Mail, Nov. 10, 1973. Everywhere one finds the same causes - a
lowering of both the morality and birth rates. See S. de Beauvoir, The Coming of Age
(New York: Putnam, 1972) at 330. See also, Spengler, "Aging Population: Mechanics,
Historical Emergence, Impact" in J. Kreps, ed., Employment, Income, and Retirement
Problems of the Aged, (Duke University Press, 1963) at 23.
G The Final Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on Aging (1966) at 1.
Old. at 10.
7D. J. Baum, The Final Plateau (to be published in 1974 by Burns and Mac-
Eachern, Toronto) c. 1. Admittedly, the federal government has taken a number of
important steps in the area of the Canada Pension Plan by increasing the benefit levels
and incorporating some form of cost of living index. But all of these payments are
far from adequate.
81d. c. 1. Moreover, even this 40% figure is misleading. A host of problems
centring on the accumulation of "credits" and inadequate vesting seriously undermine
the quality of this coverage. See Work in America, (Report of a Special Task Force to
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973) at 73.
9 See De Beauvoir, supra, note 4 at 410. See also, Ostry and Podoluk, The Economic
Status of the Aging (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1966); Podoluk, 3 Income Characteristics
of the Older Population: Submission to the Senate Committee on Aging (Proceedings of
the Special Committee of the Senate on Aging, 1966), at 1205; Report of the Special
Senate Committee on Poverty in Canada (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1971); Adams,
Cameron, Hill, Penz, The Real Poverty Report (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig, 1971);
Batchelder, The Economics of Poverty (New York: Wiley, 1966); Harp and Hofley,
ed., Poverty in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971); Harring-
ton, The Other America (New York: MacMillan, 1962); W. Mann, ed., Poverty and
Social Policy in Canada (Vancouver: Copp, Clark, 1970).
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the economic problems of the aging population continue to present a serious chal-
lenge. Everything we learned confirms the view, expressed at the outset- that
older people and more especially those denied the support of a family -are a low
income group, both absolutely and by comparison with younger adults. Not only so,
but older people, unlike younger adults, have little prospect of improving their
condition through their own efforts. Only about one in six of them (one in four of
the men) is in the labour force and even this low rate of participation is definitely
falling. Older people, therefore, are not able to benefit from the gains resulting from
increased industrial productivity, while at the same time their meager incomes are
subject to erosion as the cost of living rises.' 0
But most importantly, this economic plight of older people may be, to a
very large extent, the result of both misguided bias and empirically unfounded
intuition about the capabilities of the older worker in the Canadian industrial
relations system." This, too, was aptly summarized by the Committee on
Aging when they wrote:
While in some instances the reluctance to take on older workers may be well-
founded, the National Employment Service is convinced that much of it is due to the
general tendency in our society, with its accent on youth, to underestimate the
capabilities of people beyond middle life. Such attitudes, unfortunately, persist in
spite of numerous studies which clearly show the relative advantage older workers
have over younger workers for the considerable variety of work, and in respect of a
number of characteristics like reliability, judgments and a low rate of absenteeism.
Hiring and retiring practices, often related to pension plans, which discriminate
against older workers are part of this general practice.12
Chronological age is not necessarily a good indication of an individual's
ability to perform a given task. Numerous studies have been made to determine
the productive abilities and capacities of older workers, and one of the most
important results is the demonstration that many older workers can and do
exceed the output of younger workers.13 Even with a decline in certain physical
attributes as a worker grows older, this person is able to maintain an efficient
level of production. For example, despite a deterioration in one's lifting ability,
few modem industrial jobs require an individual to perform at his maximum
physical capacity. Most modem-day plants are equipped with machinery
designed to lessen the arduous, physical burden of the worker. Furthermore,
decline in dexterity and agility may be compensated for by the skill and know-
how of experience. This is so not only in the specific job but also in the general
job situation which requires coping with special contingencies and working
10 Final Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on Aging (Ottawa, Queen's
Printer, 1966) at 15.
11 De Beauvoir, supra, note 4 at 42 and 346, has suggested that this has been a
deliberate social choice. See also, Orbach and Tibbitts, Aging and the Economy (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1963); M. Derber, ed., The Aged and
Society, (Industrial Relations Research Assoc., 1950); Streib and Schneider, Retirement
in American Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Busse and Pfeiffer, ed.,
Aging and Society (Russell Sage Foundation, 1968).
12 See, supra, note 10 at 23.
13 Daily Labor Report, 1-7-74, Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, at A-6. See, as well, L.
Greenberg, Productivity of Older Workers, (The Gerontologist 38-41, 1961); R. Droege,
Effects and Aptitude-Score Adjustments by Age Curves on Prediction of Job Performance
(1967), 51 J. of Applied Psychology, at 181-186; Laufer and Fowler, Jr. Work Potential
of the Aging (1971), 34 Personnel Administration, at 20-25; H. Sheppard Toward an
Industrial Gerontology (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Pub., 1970); de Beauvoir,
supra, note 4 at 341-343.
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with other people. Moreover, while younger people may be physically stronger
than someone of greater age, it may also be that younger people are more likely
to present discipline problems to management and to be subject to a greater
degree of absenteeism from work. Each of these characteristics have an adverse
impact on an individual's productivity. In fact, some firms have begun to
experiment in the utilization of older workers already. For example, the Philips
firm in Holland has set up a workshop of part-time jobs for retired employees.
These 250 pensioners averaging 70 years of age, work three hour shifts and
their work has meant a $75,000 net profit to the company.14
Finally, with very minor changes, jobs can be redesigned and thereby add
literally years to an employee's work life. Might not a chair or stool be fashioned
for a work bench, giving an older worker an opportunity of performing some
of the work from a seated position? Surely many jobs are susceptible to a
similar redesign at a very small cost. Unfortunately today, as in the past, older
workers are stereotyped by the assumptions that they are less productive, they
cannot easily be retrained, or that they are inflexible. These generalities are
applied to the older worker as a class without a real evaluation of the back-
ground, experience and capabilities of the worker as an individual. Even present
day public policy evidences this invidious discrimination. s
The vicious circle is therefore clearly apparent. These unfounded societal
biases place older persons on inadequate fixed incomes within a society experi-
encing ravaging inflation and accelerating productivity. This in turn forces
them to give up many of the comforts of modem-day life at a very inopportune
time, and to make soul-destroying claims upon relatives. Furthermore, for
many older people, the loss of identity associated with compulsory retirement
may present a stark social reality. This may be so if one's life revolves about
one's job, a revolution that suddenly and unnaturally stops at age 66. The
consequence is described by one informed observer in the following way:
In short, the retired older man and his wife are imprisoned in a roleless role. They
have no vital function to perform ... This roleless role is thrust upon the older
person at retirement and to a greater or lesser degree he has accepted it and become
resigned to it.16
As a consequence of all of these factors, it is evident that an enlightened
policy objective for a modem industrial society should be the retention of older
workers in the work force and not their enforced attrition. In this regard,
retraining programmes, the redesign of job functions and flexible retirement
policies should become the norms of the Canadian industrial relations system,
14 The Older Worker in Today's Economy and Community: Report of Proceedings
of 1st Seminar on Age Discrimination, and Age Discrimination Act of Ontario, as
sponsored by The Ontario Human Rights Commission, Age Discrimination Division,
June 4, 1970.
15 Witness, for example, the legislation that has been enacted to combat age dis-
crimination. It does not apply to discrimination directed at people- over the age of 65.
The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 19. See also, Work in Amer-
Ica, supra, note 8 at 69-70.
16E. Burgess, ed., Aging in Western Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960) at 20. See also, Work in America, Id. at 70. But see Streib and Schneider,
Retirement in American Society, supra, note 11 at 164.
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as opposed to being present-day exceptions. 17 Retirement is not a neutral event
in our lives. While we are told that retirement is the time of freedom and leisure,
the foregoing socio-economic realities suggest otherwise. And surely it was
these realities that caused Simone de Beauvoir to lament:
Society inflicts so wretched a standard of living upon the vast majority of old people
,that it is almost tautological to say 'old and poor': again, most exceedingly poor
people are old. Leisure does not open up new possibilities for the retired man, just
when he is at last set free from compulsion and restraint, the means of making use
of his library are taken from him. He is condemned to stagnate in boredom and
loneliness, a mere throw-out.18
With this brief, and possibly too one-sided, sketch of the context in which
a retired person must live, let us now assess the legal merits of Bell Canada by
first developing a logical intuitive response to Bell Canada's claims that:
i) it can compulsorily retire its employees, and that ii) the arbitrator was
wrong in holding that such a termination must be reviewed under Article 8-
the provision requiring just cause in order to terminate an employee. To begin
with, termination of employment presents a worker with the same socio-
economic outcome whether his termination is called "a retirement" or "a
discharge." Therefore, one would expect that clear and specific wording in a
collective agreement would be required before an employer could impose
termination upon a worker without cause and without his consent. Stated
another way, one would expect that the "right" to retire was a right of the
employee to leave the work force if and when that person deems it economically
and psychologically feasible. As I will later argue, a management right to retire
a worker without his consent is not a very logical legal proposition. But this is
not to say that should an older worker be unfit to perform in his job an employer
would be unable to terminate him. Inability to perform one's job function is
certainly just cause for discharge, and on exercising this management right to
discharge for just cause, any pension rights that the employee might have could
then be activated. Therefore, our intuition leads us to conclude that there is no
inherent management right to retire a worker without his consent or the consent
of his agent.
Now, for Bell's second claim-that the arbitrator was wrong and the
courts should intervene. If this kind of claim is freely embraced by courts of
law, the "final and binding" qualities of grievance labour arbitration will be
irrevocably undermined. Furthermore, one would expect a labour arbitrator,
because of his specialized experience in such matters, to be more expert than
a court in applying the "law of the collective agreement". This fact, coupled
with the time and expense endemic to judicial review, should buttress our
presumption against uninhibited judicial intervention.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada shares in neither of these
17 See, supra, note 12 at 8 and 95.
18 De Beauvoir, supra, note 13 at 15. The emphasis on novelty existing as it does
with a rapid introduction of social change, has created a society based upon, what
Alvin Toffier calls, a "throw-away" culture. A. Toffier, Future Shock (New York:
Random House, 1970). The aged are our "throw-aways". See also, Work in America,
supra, note 16 at 67. This quality of our modem culture is brilliantly detailed by P.
Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
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intuitions, for in the very sparsely worded and sparsely reasoned majority
judgment of Bell Canada, Judson J. decreed:
Article 8 of the collective agreement reading "The Company may dismiss or suspend
an employee" cannot possibly be read as "dismiss, or suspend, or retire on pension."
Until the words "retire on pension" appear in Article 8 of the collective agreement,
there can be no basis for the arbitrator's decision. Dismissal, suspension and retire-
ment on pension are three different and distinct concepts. The result is that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers. 19
How the Court came to ignore: i) the plight of the older worker; ii) its
role in supervising labour arbitration boards; and iii) the law of the collective
agreement, is a disheartening story but a story that cannot go unreviewed.
And were it not for the brilliant dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Laskin,
now the Chief Justice of the Court, the tale would be very grim indeed.
I have argued elsewhere that most instances of judicial intervention into
the Canadian industrial relations system have been uninformed and disas-
trously harmful, and the Bell Canada decision is no exception.20 While it seems
so futile to restate the values of grievance arbitration and the undermining effect
of an unrestrained judicial intervention, the Bell Canada decision with its
implications for older workers and grievance arbitration cannot be overlooked.
On May 15, 1971, the arbitrator ruled that compulsory retirement was prima
facie a "dismissal" and subject to Article 8 of the agreement. This ruling was
upheld by the Ontario High Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal.1 Then, in
May 1973, some two years later, the Supreme Court of Canada quashed the
award in the summary fashion that it did. The time, expense, and harmful legal
result generated by this kind of judicial review is obvious to all-grievance
arbitration evolved to avoid just such costs. Of course, there are those who
argue that if an arbitrator has usurped authority, he should be stripped of such
pretense. If this process is costly, it is no more so than the costs sustained by
the party burdened by a wrong decision. And this kind of argument has partic-
ular appeal when an arbitrator's award suffers from bias or fraud, for no one
would argue that such an award should stand.2-
10 While at first glance the decision merely places the onus of bargaining voluntary
retirements upon the union, the political realities of a trade union suggest the decision
is much more determinative. A trade union must accommodate the demands of many
interests of which the younger worker and the older worker is only one conflicting set.
If older workers stay on, younger workers are denied jobs and promotions. Furthermore,
younger workers have a longer "dues paying" horizon. But even if the younger worker's
interest is not given priority, it is very doubtful that voluntary retirement would become
a strike issue or even be of high priority on a bargaining agenda. For these reasons the
Bell Canada decision is likely to be conclusive on this issue.
20 G. Adams, Grievance Arbitration and Judicial Review in North America (1971),
9 Osgoode Hall L. J. 443. See as well, P. Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Cars-
well/Methuen, 1974); P. Weiler, The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention (1971),
9 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1; Christensen, "Judicial Review: As Arbitrators See It" in
Labour Arbitration at the Quarter Century Mark (Proceedings of 25th Ann. Meeting,
Nat'l Academy of Arbitration, 1972) at 99.
21 See, supra, note 1.
22 And I agree that in the case of bias and fraud a court should intervene. First, it
does not take industrial relations expertise to determine if such exists (but see Re Cana-
dian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd., [19731 3 O.R. 240 (Div. CL)), and secondly,
such intervention is aimed at preserving the integrity of grievance arbitration.
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But these attempts to justify the judicial review of substantive matters go
too far and are usually too simplistic. Difficult questions of law that reach
arbitration entail applications of reasoned judgment. There is no clearly right
or wrong answer-if there was, the parties would have settled the dispute long
before spending the money and time that even grievance arbitration involves.
What the parties want is a reasoned decision from the arbitrator and thereby
a "final and binding" resolution of their dispute. Furthermore, most arbitrators,
people who are selected by both parties, are selected because of their experience
and expertise in resolving disputes over the meaning of collective agreements.
They are specialists. Is it a sufficient reason to expend more time and money
entailed in a review by a judicial officer, a person the parties have not selected
and who generally has little previous acquaintance with industrial relations,
because that officer disagrees with the decision of an arbitrator? No doubt an
arbitrator must work within the rule of law but when the rule of law is really
the reasoned elaboration of the ambiguous and vague wording found in collec-
tive agreements, reasonable men can differ over the meaning of that law. And
so, at the very least, if the arbitrator's decision is reasonable, a court should
discourage the party seeking its opinion. Thus Ontario courts, in reviewing
grievance arbitration boards constituted under The Ontario Labour Relations
Act, have arrived at just such a standard of deferential review. They have held
that no court should trifle with an arbitration award unless it is clearly and
unreasonably wrong or unless it is subject to bias and fraud.23 Surely they are
right. There should be no gamesmanship over jurisdictional errors, or errors
of law on the face of the record. The award-no matter how in error-must be
unreasonably wrong. And should courts prove disingenuous in applying this
standard, legislatures should not be hesitant to draft more rebuffing privative
clauses as the British Columbia legislature recently has.24 Judicial review casts
a very long shadow25 over the industrial relation system. The availability of
judicial intervention forces the parties to be more technical in their approach
to both collective bargaining and the grievance process. In turn, as more
emphasis is given to technical details, the system becomes less comprehensible
to the parties, and this leads both to misunderstanding, and eventually, more
industrial conflict.
This is the importance of Mr. Justice Laskin's dissent: it is the first
thoroughly reasoned judicial opinion outlining the appropriate standard of
23 Re Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd., and Local 164, Draftsmen's Assn. of On-
tario, [1962] O.R. 17 at 20; 30 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at 676; Re Ford Motor Co. of
Canada Ltd., and Int'l Union, United Automobile Workers of America, [1972] 1 O.R.
26, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 151; Re Taylor, and Ford Motor Co. of Canada, [1974] 1 Q.R. (2d)
398; Re United Glass Workers and Dominion Glass Co., [19741 1 O.R. (2d) 408; but
see, Re Hospital Commission, Sarnia General Dist. Building Service Workers' Union,
Loc. 220, S.E.LU., [19731 1 O.R. 240 (Div. Ct.); The Metropolitan Toronto Board of
Commissioners of Police v. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Association and Weller
(1972), 72 C.L.L.C. para. 14, 125 (Ont. C.A.) recently upheld by the Supreme Court
of Canada. And see generally, P. Weiler, Remedies in Labour Arbitration: The Revised
Judicial Version (1974), Can. Bar Rev. (March Issue).
24 Labour Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122 assented to Nov. 7, 1973.
Not all of the sections are as yet proclaimed in force. But for the privative language,
see ss. 31, 32, 33*, 34*, and 35* (*proclaimed effective Jan. 14, 1974.)
25 This is a phrase suggested by my colleague, Dean Harry Arthurs.
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judicial review in private labour arbitration matters. It must be remembered
that the board of arbitration in Bell was a consensual board (this explains
why the Ontario High Court could hear the matter in the first instance as
opposed to the Federal Court doing so) 26 and hoary old case law suggests that
a court cannot set aside the award of a consensual arbitration board save:
1) if its jurisdiction is exceeded; 2) if an error in law appears on the face of the
record, unless that issue of law was directly submitted to it for decision (the
"Absalom rule ' 27 as Mr. Justice Laskin coined it); and 3) if fraud, bias, or gross
misconduct is present.28 This second ground for intervention, the "Absalom
rule", is the most important basis of judicial intervention in the Bell Canada
decision: Judson I. held that specific construction of Article 8 arose out
of the arbitrator's determination and was not directly submitted by the parties
for his consideration. Accordingly, he then went on to disagree with the
arbitrator's ruling and reverse the result-an outcome that was as harmful to
the process of labour arbitration as it was to the older worker. By contrast,
Mr. Justice Laskin saw the case raising two important institutional issues.
First, would a court be reasonable in holding that the construction of Article 8
was not directly submitted to the arbitrator? Secondly, even if this was the
case (that Article 8 arose in the course of the proceedings), should the fact
that a court disagrees with an arbitrator be sufficient grounds for judicial
intervention-particularly in light of the purposes and origin of grievance
arbitration and the costs of judicial review.
Both the Judge of the first instance and the Court of Appeal dismissed
the application for review on the ground that the case was one in which a
specific question of law had been referred to an arbitrator for decision and
that the court could not intervene even if it appeared to the members of the
court that the arbitrator's decision upon this question of law was erroneous.
Judson J. disagreed with both of these courts and dispensed with their reasons
in writing:
This is not a case where the parties by agreement ousted the jurisdiction of the courts
to determine a question of law by choosing to have that question determined by a
judge of their own making. This matter came up in the ordinary course on the
hearing of a grievance which was characterized by the employee as a dismissal and
by the Company as a retirement on pension. It is obvious -from the letter which the
Company wrote when it consented to the appointment of the arbitrator that there
would be a preliminary objection to jurisdiction. This was all that was done on the
first hearing before the arbitrator. He made his decision to proceed with the arbitra-
20 For the legal hydraulics of this conclusion, see Laskin J.'s dissent in Association
of Radio and Television Employees of Canada v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(1973), 73 C.L.L.C. para. 14, 189.
A very nice question surrounds whether the Ontario High Court can review the
award of a consensual labour arbitration board today as opposed to the Ontario Divi-
sional Court. The Ontario High Court upheld the arbitrator on November 2, 1971
(unreported), and The Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48 was not pro-
claimed in force until April 17, 1972 (see Ontario Gazette, Vol. 105, no. 14, April 1,
1972). As a consequence, that Act had no application at the time; but section 6 of this
legislation reads:
6(1) Subject to subsection 2, an application for judicial review shall be made to
the Divisional Court.
(2) An application for judicial review may be made to the High Court with
leave of a judge thereof, which may be granted at the hearing of the application,
[VOL. 12, No. 2
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where it is made to appear to the judge that the case is one of urgency and that
the delay required for an application to the Divisional Court is likely to involve
a failure of justice.
And part of section 2 reads:
2(1) On an application by way of originating notice, which may be styled "Notice
of Application for Judicial Review," the court may, notwithstanding any right of
appeal, by order grant any relief that the applicant would be entitled to in any
one or more of the following:
1. Proceedings by way of an order in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or
certiorari.
2. Proceedings by way of action for a declaration or for an injunction or both,
in relation to the exercise, refusal to exercise or proposed or purported exer-
cise of a statutory power.
Accordingly, it could be argued that because courts review consensual arbitration boards
as a matter of contract, as a matter of its inherent jurisdiction (Canadian Co-operative
Implements Ltd. v. Local 3960 United Steelworkers of America, 69 C.L.L.C. para. 14,
207 (Man. Q.B. 1969), or as a matter of provincial arbitration legislation (Int'l Wood-
workers of America, Local 1-71 v. Weldwood of Canada Ltd., 70 C.L.L.C. para.
14,033 (B.C.C.A.)), and not by way of the prerogative writs. The Ontario Divisional
Court has no jurisdiction. On the other hand, it could be argued that because section
2(1) of The Judicial Review Procedures Act gives that Court jurisdiction in matters
"in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari" and there exists judicial opinion
to the effect that judicial review of consensual arbitration boards and statutory arbitra-
ion boards are equivalent proceedings, at least for the purpose of procedure (see Regina
v. Arthurs, ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co., 68 C.L.L.C. para. 14,136 at s. 90
(S.C.C.)), such review is "in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari."
For a recent exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction, see Re General Truck Drivers'
Union, Local 938, and Bulk Carriers Ltd., [1974] 2 O.R. (2d) 81 (H.C.).
27 An error of law on the face of the record that does not go to jurisdiction is no
longer grounds for reviewing a labour arbitration award under the Canadian Labour
Code because of s. 156 which reads:
156. (1) Every order or decision of an arbitrator appointed pursuant to a
collective agreement or of an arbitration board is final and shall not be questioned
or reviewed by any court.
(2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any
court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or
otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain an arbitrator or arbitration
board in any of his or its proceedings under this Part.
(3) For the purposes of the Federal Court Act, an arbitrator appointed
pursuant to a collective agreement or an arbitration board is not a federal board,
commission or other tribunal within the meaning of that Act.
Unfortunately, this provision was not proclaimed in force until March 1, 1973. (See
Canadian Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18, assented to July 7, 1972, proclaimed effective
March 1, 1973.) As to the general effect of such a privative clause, see Re Ontario
Labour Relations Board, Bradley v. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (1957), 8
D.L.R. (2d) 65; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc.
796, et al., 70 C.L.L.C. para. 14,008 (S.C.C.); Laskin, Certiorari of Labour Boards:
The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev. 986.
28F.R. Alsalom, Limited, and Great Western (London) Garden Village Society,
Ltd., [1973] A.C. 592 at 67. Lord Russell of Killowen wrote:
My Lords, it is, I think, essential to keep the case where disputes are referred to
an arbitrator in the decision of which a question of law becomes material distinct
from the case in which a specific question of law has been referred to him for
decision. I am not sure that the Court of Appeal has done so. The authorities
make a clear distinction between these two cases, and, as they appear to me, they
decide that in the former case the Court can interfere if and when any error of
law appears on the face of the award, but that in the latter case no such inter-
ference is possible upon the ground that it so appears that the decision upon the
question of law is an erroneous one.
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tion. There was nothing to prevent the Company from asking the Court for an
immediate review of this decision. The arbitrator's decision was one which the
Court ought to have reviewed and reversed.29
But Mr. Justice Laskin disagreed with him in writing a dissent that appears
unassailable. In that the standard of review he reasons and recommends went
undiscussed by the majority, and because Laskin's perspective may be a re-
flection of the Court's approach in the future moreover, we need to carefully
review this reasoning.
It was his opinion that in the circumstances there had been a reference of
a specific question of law to the arbitrator by the parties. As a consequence,
his opinion was unreviewable. To object to the arbitrability of a dispute on the
basis that the word "dismissal" in Article 8 did not embrace "retirement on
pension" in no way affected the fact that in submitting this dispute to the
arbitrator the parties were asking him for a specific ruling on the meaning of
Article 8. But, recognizing how reasonable men might differ on this point-that
one might believe the specific question submitted actually entailed answering
whether just cause for dismissal existed and, accordingly, the meaning of
Article 8 was a necessary but collateral determination-Mr. Justice Laskin went
on to fashion a rule of construction in determining when a specific question of
law has been submitted to an arbitrator.
It was his admonition that "the exception of non-interference should be
liberally construed" and in arriving at this recommendation he closely examined
both the evolution of the judicial doctrine in the area (the "Absalom rule") and
the nature of the Canadian industrial relations context being reviewed. To begin
with, the learned Justice questioned whether the judicial distinction (the review
of a general submission in contrast to a specific reference of law) made any
sense at all, particularly in relation to labour-management arbitration in On-
tario - a province whose legislation excludes the application thereto of the
provincial Arbitration Act.3 0 Furthermore, the principles of "law" applied in
grievance arbitration hearings are the provisions and wording of collective bar-
gaining agreements. In effect, the parties legislate for themselves, leaving univer-
sal principles of common law with very little relevance. In fact, it was noted that
the courts of law have no original jurisdiction when it comes to enforcing col-
lective agreements. Therefore, as a consequence of social changes and the speci-
fic intent of legislatures in many provinces to by-pass the more general arbitra-
tion legislation, and by implication the common law, the efficacy of a jurisdic-
tion within the courts to entertain reviews of "questions of law" arising out of
general submissions to labour arbitrators is dubious. And one might add that
because of the way most grievances are formulated on the "shop floor," a
requirement of more specificity in submissions is simply unrealistic. All that
can be said about a submission to arbitration is that at the time of lodging a griev-
20 See, supra, note 21.
30 Of course, it is extremely doubtful that provincial arbitration legislation applies
to an entity falling with federal jurisdiction. See Etmanski v. Taggart Service Ltd.,
[1966] 1 O.R. 473, 54 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (C.A.). See also, Commn. du Salaire Minimwn v.
Bell Telephone Co., 1966] S.C.R. 767, 59 D.L.R. (2d) 145. But the analogy is appro-
priate nevertheless.
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ance the parties desire a quick, inexpensive, and informal resolution of their
dispute in order to maintain a viable if not harmonious relationship with each
other.
While these same factors indicate that the "Absalom rule" may be in-
appropriate, they also suggest that, where applied, it ought to receive a liberal
construction. Mr. Justice Laskin so proposed. Moreover, he went on to buttress
this standard of deference by demonstrating that judicial review in the case of
a general reference to a consensual board of arbitration arose originally as a
exception to a pre-existing rule of non-interference with awards of arbitrators
cited in Kent v. Elstob. In this regard, after establishing this contention by way
of excerpts from Hodgkinson v. Fernie, and Knox v. Symmonds, Laskin con-
cluded:
The considerations which originally persuaded the English Courts not to interfere
and certainly not save for grave reasons, with awards of arbitrators, namely, the
evident wish of the parties for a non-curial determination as well as finality, without
courting appeals, gave rise to an exception from what became the general rule,
although the general rule was itself originally an exception....
I question whether the concluding sentence, stating the rationale for the exception,
is any less valid in relation to the submission of a general issue to arbitration. Be that
as it may, the whole development indicates to me that the exception of non-interfer-
ence should be liberally construed. Moreover, if the general law of arbitration and
reviewability of awards is to be applied to labour-management arbitrations under
collective agreements, where the Courts have no original jurisdiction, it appears to
me to be plain sense to confine interference to what, for want of precise definition, I
would call gross error. Especially in a situation of on-going collective bargaining rela-
tions, where the parties themselves legislate for the common enterprise and provide
their own supervisory and administrative machinery without judicial oversight-they
should be equally left pretty well alone with their adjudicative machinery.3 '
His words, therefore, represent a valuable response to the many complaints
that arbitration awards are often overturned by judicial legerdemain involving
nothing more than a mere difference of opinion between the courts and the
arbitrators - a result that looks more like an appeal in blind neglect of the final
and binding intendment of grievance arbitration. Accordingly, Mr. Justice
Laskin suggests that submission to arbitration should be viewed as a reference
of a specific issue of law unless there exists a clear, undoubted indication to the
contrary.
As for the second and very much related issue - assuming a general refer-
ence was involved in Bell what standard of review should be applied to con-
sensual arbitration boards - the learned Judge was quick to emphasize that the
review of an arbitrator's decision by a court is not an appeal in which a court
may properly substitute its own opinion on the correctness of the arbitral
determination. On this point he elaborates:
Whether I as an arbitrator or as a judge would have come to the same conclusion is
not a dominant consideration. Is it so clear that a unilateral discretionary termination
of service, such as occurred under the Company-administered plan, must be held, as
*a matter of law, not to be a dismissal because the Company refers to it as a retire-
ment? "Retire" is both intransitive and transitive in the dictionaries, and certainly the
grievor did not retire but was retired. In plain English, he was put out of his job. An
arbitrator who concludes that he was dismissed, but without deciding the question
31 See, supra, note 29.
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of "sufficient and reasonable cause" is, in my view, not giving an outrageous meaning
to the term "dismissal" under a collective agreement providing for the amicable
settlement of grievance and, ultimately, for the arbitration of grievances "relating
to the interpretation or alleged violation" of the collective agreement. The arbitrator
in the present case is not the first one who has held that compulsory retirement at the
instance of the employer alone is arbitrable as a discharge. His reasons cite cases in
which other arbitrators, indeed judges acting as arbitrators, have so held.32
Therefore, the Chief Justice held that a court should only intervene if the
arbitrator has given an "outrageous meaning" to the provision of the collective
agreement in question - a standard that is even more deferential than that
currently used to supervise statutory arbitration boards in Ontario. Today there
are so many criticisms of the time, expense and mysticism associated with the
judicial process that courts must be willing to make the maximum use of alter-
native dispute resolving agencies. 33 This kind of supervisory standard provides a
full jurisdiction to inferior tribunals and rightly assumes that they are respon-
sible law administering bodies.
But it is important not to stop here and merely complain how misguided the
majority was. Mr. Justice Judson made no effort to canvass the arbitral juris-
prudence dealing with company retirement - the law of the collective agree-
ment. Nor did he bother to reply to the detailed rationale of the arbitrator's
ruling on this issue. He simply disagreed in such an abrupt manner as to imply
that any suggestion of the equivalency between discharge and compulsory
retirement was clearly and unequivocally outrageous. For this reason, but in a
very brief way, I want to review the arbitral jurisprudence considered by the
arbitrator, Professor Weiler. It should become obvious that his reasoning, par-
ticularly in light of the adversities facing the older worker discussed above, not
only fails to be outrageous but is probably right.
Professor Weiler's decision was the first arbitration award both to critically
examine the jurisprudence and, in rationalizing these pre-existing cases, to
establish a firm, coherent principle. Prior to the Bell award there had been a
series of cases considering whether compulsory retirement could be distin-
guished from a discharge. But unfortunately the results of these arbitral machin-
ations, if taken in isolation, substantially undermine the basis to my above-
mentioned praise of "arbitral expertise." Their reasoning is far from satisfac-
tory - in fact, much of the reasoning fails to suggest a real comprehension of
the issues involved. Happily, such a phenomenon is more the exception than
the rule and, to be fair, even here it is more reflective of an evolution of principle
than of an unconscionable neglect.
It is essential to emphasize at the outset of this review that these awards
must be considered in light of two important jurisprudential developments in
Canadian labour law. First, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court of
Canada in Le Syndicat Catholique des Employes de Magasins du Quebec Inc.
v. La Compagnie Paquet Lte.34 affirmed the exclusivity of the union's bargain-
32 Id.
s3 See generally, G. Adams, Towards a Mobilization of the Adversary Process
(1974), 12 Osgoode Hall LJ. (page not available).
84 (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346 (S.C.C.).
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ing status. The relevant passage of the Court's opinion (a judgment delivered by
Mr. Justice Judson, incidently) reads:
... The union is, by virtue of its incorporation under the Professional Syndicates' Act
and its certification under the Labour Relations Act, the representative of all employ-
ees in the unit for the purpose of negotiating the labour agreement. There is no room
left for private negotiation between employer and employee. Certainly to the extent
of the matters covered by the collective agreement, freedom of contract between
master and individual servant is abrogated. The collective agreement tells the
employer on what terms he must in the future conduct his master and servant rela-
tions. When this collective agreement was made, it then became the duty of the
employer to modify his contracts of employment in accordance with its terms so far
as the inclusion of those terms is authorized by the governing statutes. The terms of
employment are defined for all employees, and whether or not they are members of
the union, they are identical for all. How did this compulsory check-off of the equiva-
lent of union dues become a term of the individual employee's contract of em-
ployment? They were told by the notice that in future this deduction would be a
term of their contract of employment. They were put to their election at this point
either to accept the term or seek other employment. They made their election by
continuing to work and the deductions were actually made. It is admitted that all
these employees were employees at will and no question arises as to the right of
the employer to make or impose new contracts or of the length of notice they may
be required to bring this about. It was not within the power of the employee to
insist on retaining his employment on his own terms, or on any terms other than
those lawfully inserted in the collective agreement. [Taschereau, Locke and
Fauteux J. dissented.]
Moreover, the line of cases commencing with Re Grottoli v. Lock & Son
Ltd.35 and ending with Hamilton Street Railway v. Northcott36 does not impinge
upon this principle of exclusivity. The contract of employment, as unrealistic as
as its existence may seem, has been held to co-exist with and embody the terms
of the collective agreement, but no court opinion has countenanced any differ-
ence in the content of these two legal relationships. And, therefore, today, if
management is going to claim a unilateral right to introduce a pension plan or
retiring policy - thereby dealing directly with its employees - it must claim
to do so through rights reserved to it within the collective agreement. This, then,
would focus the inquiry on the management rights clause, which brings us to the
second important jurisprudential development.
At this juncture in the "climate of Canadian industrial relations" there is
little doubt that management has reserved onto itself a bundle of unspecified
rights to manage the enterprise; a union must specifically derogate from these
rights if its claims are to prevail.3 7 For example, despite the absence of specific
wording reserving a management right to contract bargaining unit work out to
subcontractors or to introduce technological changes which eliminate bargain-
ng unit jobs, it has been held that management now possesses a right to do
so. 38 A union must achieve the requisite contractual specificity to control these
events. Thus it could be argued that management has a similar inherent right
to retire workers without their consent.
35 (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 128 (Ont. H.C.).
86 (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 708 (S.C.C.).
37 See Weiler, Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change (Task Force Study No. 6,
Canada, 1969).
38 Re United Steelworkers of America and Russel Steel Ltd. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 253
(Arthurs).
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The argument must be examined closely for on doing so it becomes appar-
ent that the justification of an inherent management right to contract out, inno-
vate, or change working schedules lacks the same compellability when applied in
the area of compulsory retirement. An industrial enterprise is a complex under-
taking riding on a sea of uncertainty. This uncertainty is a product of the highly
dynamic, technical, market, budgetary and power contexts within which the
actors of an industrial relations system must operate. Accordingly, to force
management to negotiate effective and necessary control over production with
the specificity required to codify every right it may need to react to these chang-
ing contexts, is to entertain a fantasy. Elsewhere I have attempted to describe
the nature and inherent obstacles of the collective negotiation process existing as
it does against the background of human emotion and limited foreseeability.39
As a result extreme specificity and detail is, in many instances, simply unobtain-
able. Thus the fact that management has not specifically reserved such rights
does not mean the union has achieved total job control. But because one of the
parties must write its positon into the contract and because, if the enterprise
is to survive for the benefit of all, the enterprise must be able to react quickly to
changing contextual demands; it is now presumed that management has certain
inherent powers unless specifically relinquished. In effect, this presumption is
felt to be a necessary implication to the proper and efficient functioning of a
commercial enterprise. Management should have the powers to initiate change
to insure the economic viability of the firm unless it specifically gives these
rights up.
However, this argument, with its underlying economic purpose, fails to
support a management right to retire employees compulsorily. In none of the
cases that we will examine, nor in the Bell case for that matter, were the em-
ployees retired because they were too old to perform the work. Rather, they
had reached an arbitrary age of 60 or 66 years of age - an age the company
had unilaterally set as the age for retirement. Why was it necessary to the enter-
prises that these people be terminated? All of them could perform their work,
and the gerontological research discussed above establishes that many older
workers are as efficient as younger workers performing the same jobs. What is
the corporate interest in this management right? Should there not be a clear
and compelling legal justification for this right in light of the harsh socio-econo-
mic implications for the older worker? We will now examine the arbitral
jurisprudence in a quest for this legal justification - a justification that Mr.
Justice Judson must have felt was self-evident. After reviewing the complexity
of arbitral jurisprudence in this area - the law of the collective agreement -
only the erroneous nature of his beliefs will be so clear.
In Port Hope Sanitary Manufacturing Company Limited,40 the first of the
cases dealing with this issue, the company retired the grievor, a man 71 years
of age, in accordance with its long-standing policy ante-dating the collective
agreement of retiring employees in its discretion, after the age of 65 years, and
3 The new edition of Labour Relations Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary,
compiled by the Labour Relations Casebook Group (1974), c. 6; and see T.C.F. of
Canada Ltd. (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 382 (Adell) at 385-6.
40 (1952), 3 L.A.C. 1144 (Cochrane).
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with a pension after 15 years of service, again in the company's discretion.
Because the grievor had worked only 10 years for the company, he was retired
without a pension. The company claimed the matter was not arbitrable, but the
board disagreed, ruling that a company cannot deprive an employee of his
grievance rights simply by describing a discharge as "retirement." However, it
then went on to hold that the non-discriminatory application of a long-standing
policy justified the company's action. This result in itself is not difficult to
accept if the underlying basis of decision is some form of estoppel principle
- the company having relied to its detriment on the union's acquiescence in the
long-standing policy. The union had not attempted to bring the existing policy
within the four comers of the collective agreement as if tacitly agreeing that
management was within its rights. This would mean that the estoppel would be
operative at least until the then present collective agreement expired - at which
time management could specifically negotiate the plan into the agreement. How-
ever, the following paragraph is an ominous indication of the board's contrary
motivation:
It cannot be seriously contended that under the terms of the present agreement the
company has no right either to set up or maintain a pension and retirement plan,
even though neither the employees nor their representatives are parties to it.41
This statement looks perilously close to sanctioning unilateral management
initiative in the area of employee retirement but provides no legal basis for the
assertion. Therefore, aside from the possible implication that the board was
adverting to a form of estoppel, this statement is simply conclusionary and,
being so, Port Hope is not a helpful award. Arbitral jurisprudence is not ham-
pered by a formal notion of precedent in that there is no hierarchal arbitral
structure.42 Acceptance of another arbitrator's reasoning depends upon twin
principles of reason and persuasion. The Port Hope case fails in both of these
regards.
In Canadian Westinghouse,43 the grievors were retired in accordance with
a long-standing company retirement-pension plan which the union had un-
successfully tried to modify in the last negotiations. The company paid all of
the pension, and the reasoning of the board in upholding the terminations
appears to be a mixture of estoppel and management rights. The dispute was
held to be arbitrable, but the retirement policy was found to be "a reasonable
one, in keeping with the common practice, [and] it has been in force for some
twenty years." In fact, in the five years preceding the grievance 194 employees
had been retired. But once again, the rationale of the board is far from explicit
as revealed by the following statement.
However, it would appear that both the employees and the union knew that there
was such a plan. There has been no submission on the part of the union (and if there
had been, it would seem untenable) that the company hasn't the right to set up a
pension and retirement plan without the union being a party to it.44
41 Id.
42 P. Weiler, The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions (1969), 19
U. of T. L. J. 16; Wickett and Craig (1963), 13 L.A.C. 363 (Arthurs).
43 (1952), 4 L.A.C. 1210 (Anderson).
44 ld.
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In the next case, Rexall Drug Co.,45 the company "retired" 4 employees
at the age of 65, pursuant to its long-standing pension plan which pre-dated the
collective agreement and which the union had not been successful in drawing
"into the ambit of collective relations." It was a condition of employment, on
the application form, that employees accept pension coverage when eligible. Two
of the employees retired were ineligible for pension benefits under the plan,
and the board reinstated them, holding that they could not be retired. But with
respect to the other two grievors retired with pension, the board concluded:
Whatever the force of the pension plan, this Board is of the opinion that retirement
thereunder does not raise a question of discharge. It is straining well known industrial
usage of the term "discharge" to have it include compulsory retirement because of
age. Can the Company then insist on enforcement of the pension plan in the face
of other terms of the Collective Agreement? If the Company had sought to introduce
a compulsory retirement policy unilaterally after the advent of the Union, then
clearly no force could be given to it. The situation here is different. The pension plan
was in effect to the knowledge of the employees and of the Union when the Union
obtained Collective Bargaining rights. As an existing condition of employment,
although applicable only to employees able to meet its eligibility requirements, it
was not expressly abrogated by the Collective Agreement; and the only possible
inconsistency between operation of the plan and the Collective Agreement lies in
the seniority and the employment security provisions. The question which remains
is, hence, whether the Collective Agreement in its provisions for seniority and
employment security should be construed to make allowance for the pension plan in
a situation where the plan was known to the employees and the Union prior to the
execution of the first Collective Agreement between the Union and the Company.46
The board did not construe these provisions to make such allowance but
went on to hold that the company was not entitled to retire some over-age
employees while keeping others at work if it acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
differentiating between the workers involved. If this did happen, (although these
were not the facts before it) such a case would be an unwarranted discharge.
Accordingly, this case looks more like one of estoppel or the use of past prac-
tice to construe and interpret ambiguous wording found in the collective agree-
ment. It does not appear, at least unequivocally, as an award supporting some
form of inherent and universal management right to retire employees.
In Libby, McNeil and Libby,47 the grievor was retired at the age of 65 pur-
suant to a policy existing since 1935 (and prior to the first collective agree-
ment). He did not receive a pension because he was ineligible under the plan,
though he did receive a small cash retirement allowance. Once again, the reason-
ing of the board in dismissing the grievance is unclear. The arbitrator simply
held that retirement was different from "discharge" or "lay-off"; that there was
nothing in the agreement about it; that the company had consistently applied
its policy in the past without objection from the union; and that the latter had
failed several times to have the agreement incorporate references to the pension
plan. He went on to write, without referring to Rexall Drug Co.:
A discharge certainly terminates employment but so does retirement and they are
not the same thing. In the field of management-labour relations, each has a well
understood meaning.48
45 (1953), 4 L.A.C. 1468 (Laskin).
40 Id.
47 (1954), 5 L.A.C. 2120 (Roach).
481d.
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The arbitrator must have had the benefit of devine insight in finding this
"well understood" meaning for certainly none of the preceding cases would
decisively lend themselves to this conclusion. As a consequence, the case fails
to provide any rational justification for its conclusion.
In Canadian Car and Foundry Ltd.,49 as Professor Weiler stresses in his
Bell Canada opinion, the situation was markedly different from those discussed
to this point. Here the company instituted a retirement-pension plan during the
term of a collective agreement which provided for discharge only for proper
cause, and for loss of seniority due to quit, lay-off for a specified period, or
discharge. However, the grievances of the employees who were retired by the
company were dismissed. It is important to note that in this case,; when the
agreement terminated, one of the chief issues in negotiation had been the com-
pulsory retirement policy. Then a strike ensued, and the dispute was settled
when the company agreed to two explicit modifications of its retirement scheme.
But, the union explicitly reserved its right to renew the assault on the compulsory
retirement by grievances under the new agreement.
Unfortunately, the arbitrator did not refer to the Rexall Drug dictum that
a unilateral introduction of a retirement plan was improper after the introduc-
tion of collective bargaining. He dismissed the grievances on the ground that
'retirement' was a form of 'termination of employment' which is different from
'discharge' or 'lay-off.' While holding that a company could not circumvent the
rules governing discharge by way of the retirement rules, he gave no criterion
to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate use of a retirement policy.
In fact, his following statement severely undermines both the exclusive bargain-
ing agent status of the union and the comprehensive nature of the collective
agreement.
I have carefully examined the union's argument that the phrase 'and all other
conditions of employment' in clause one, means that the agreement contains a list
of all the conditions of employment in the sense that no more can be introduced and
in particular that no rule regarding compulsory retirement can be introduced. I have
concluded that the phrase in question merely indicates that the parties hope or
plan or expect to achieve a certain objective. It is a statement of purpose rather
than a statement of accomplishment as the title of the clause indicates. It does not
establish that the parties have, in ,fact, agreed to and enumerated in the clauses that
follow all the conditions of employment. Therefore, it does not stand in the way of
the company's application of a new condition affecting employment, namely, the
rule that an employee shall retire upon attaining the age of 65.50
This is the first case to assert boldly that management can unilaterally
introduce additional terms of employment or that such is an inherent manage-
ment right. All of the preceding cases had a thread of estoppel woven through
them or the implication that a tacit union assent to such policies had been
used to interpret otherwise ambiguous language. Unfortunately, this arbitrator
fails to tell us why management must possess this right and how it logically co-
exists with the union's exclusive bargaining status derived from labour relations
legislation. Hence, the case, in and of itself, fails at the level of persuasion, and
unsurprisingly Professor Weiler refused to follow it.
49 (1955), 6 LA.C. 161 (Curtis).
1O ld.
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In William Kennedy and Sons51 the grievor was 76 years of age and his job
was shovelling coal into a stoker hopper. There was no question surrounding
his physical capacity to continue on in the job. The pension plan post-dated both
the employment of the grievor and the bargaining rights attained by the union.
Furthermore, the grievor had not participated in the plan. Claiming to follow
Rexall Drug, the board distinguished between compulsory and voluntary plans,
and between those ante-dating and those post-dating the existence of collective
bargaining; accordingly, it was held that the grievor could not be retired. But
in doing so, by relying upon this sterile categorization of fact and legal outcome,
the legal basis of the decision is obscured. No policy justification was given to
support the prohibition against the compulsory retirement of an employee by
a plan that post-dates the bargaining rights of the trade union nor was any clear
rationale provided for the "compulsory versus voluntary" distinction. The end
result was to leave arbitrators and judges in a conceptual vacuum which then
permitted the evolution of a management right to retire employees compul-
sorily. The remaining few cases illustrate just how instrumental this conceptual
vacuum was.
In Dominion Tar and Chemical52 the grievor was retired at the age of 70.
He joined the company in 1939, and in 1942 the company unilaterally intro-
duced a voluntary contributory pension plan. However, the plan had never been
mentioned in the collective agreement and the grievor had not subscribed to
the arrangement. Now faced with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Canadian Car and Foundry v. Dinham53 which had upheld an arbitration
award denying a grievance of an employee who had been retired pursuant to a
"compulsory retirement-pension plan" which had been unilaterally instituted
by the company during the term of a collective agreement, the board distin-
guished it and other awards on the basis that in the case facing it the compulsory
retirement age was not separate from the pension plan and was only applicable
to those who participated in the plan. The grievor was not a participant and
hence his grievance was upheld. But, in this case, one starts to detect the basic
legitimization of these unilateral management actions. The decision-making
effort centers more on considering the voluntary nature of the plan than upon
the legal justification validating its very existence.
To the extent that this approach was motivated by Dinham it is important
to appreciate that the ratio of the Dinham case was clearly that once a grievance
had been lodged on behalf of an employee and an arbitration award given, a
civil suit can not subsequently be brought by the employee for that same claim.
The importance of this recognition stems from the subsequent impact of an
accompanying obiter dictum of Mr. Justice Abbott that "the determination of a
mandatory retirement age, applicable to all employees, is clearly a function of
management..., and a compulsory retirement at age 65 is not a violation of the
clauses in the collective agreement respecting seniority rights." This statement
was not necessary to the outcome of the Dinham case although it may have in-
fluenced the arbitrator in the Dominion Tar and Chemical case. Of course,
01 (1959), 10 L.A.C. 121 (Hanrahan).
2 (1960), 19 L.A.C. 121 (Hanrahan).
53, [1960] S.C.R. 3.
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Judson J. in Bell Canada converts this dictum into law: but until then it was
merely the gratuitous comment of a Supreme Court Justice and as such was not
binding. Moreover, Abbott J. failed to give any genuine reasoning leading up to
his conclusion - a trait all too common in the Supreme Court of Canada.
The last arbitration award to be reviewed is the Canadian Forest Products54
case. The grievor was retired pursuant to a newly-announced policy of the com-
pany to retire employees at the age of 70 with compensation, and in this case
the arbitrator, in an apparent act of blind obeisance to Mr. Justice Abbott, held
that the effect of the obiter dictum in Dinham, and the more recent decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Sandwich Windsor and Amherst Rly. Co.,55 was
to establish "a unilateral right of management to dismiss employees because of
age at an age to be decided by management .... It is a right to dismiss for
cause, the cause being age... and a cause which can be unilaterally established
by the employer." Of course, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Dinham case
held no such thing nor does a close reading of the Court of Appeal decision that
he cited justify this conclusion. In the Sandwich case, the company had unilater-
ally instituted a compulsory retirement policy for all employees in the face of
a negotiated pension plan which referred to retirement due to old age and/or
sickness rendering the employee physically unfit or unqualified for his job. The
majority of the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge and board of arbitra-
tion and held that this provision did not, either expressly or by necessary impli-
cation, cut down on the power of management to retire employees. This deci-
sion focused specifically on the clause in the agreement dealing with the pension
plan and did not deal with the question whether this 'common law' manage-
ment power or right might be limited by a discharge clause or the seniority
clause. Over the years there has been a growing tendency on the part of some
arbitrators to give an overly broad reading to judicial statements and this case is
quite representative.
This ends our review of the pre-existing arbitration pronouncements.
Aside from a few other cases,5 6 the jurisprudence (and I use that word charit-
ably) says no more until the Bell Canada award. It is apparent that this string
of cases created a wide range of arbitral opinion with no unanimity in the reasons
given for the decisions. While it is true that in every case where the pension
plan or retirement policy ante-dated the collective bargaining relationship and
54 (1962), 12 L.A.C. 25 (Wilson).
55 (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 704 (Ont. C.A.).
5 6 Durham-Bush (Canada) Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 270 (Lang); Re Montreal News-
paper Guild, Loc. 111, and Montreal Star Co. Ltd. (1962), 12 L.A.C. 301 (Poisson);
Re U.A.W., Loc. 399, and Anaconda American Brass Ltd. (1963), 14 L.A.C. 52
(Cross); and more recently, see Re U.S.W., Loc. 1500, and Ontario Malleable Iron Co.
Ltd. (1967), 19 L.A.C. 1 (Palmer); Re Pulp and Paper-workers of Canada and Mac-
Millan-Bloedel Industries Ltd. (1970), 21 L.A.C. 148 (Bird); London and District
Building Service Workers Union, Loc. 220, and Perth County Board of Education
(1972), 24 L.A.C. 91 (Hinnegan); Re Shell Canada Ltd., and Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, Loc. 9-600 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 229 (Bellan). The last case
was quashed in Shell Canada Ltd. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers int'l Union,
Loc. 9-600, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 660 (Man. Q.B.). Note that for the purposes of brevity
I have omitted B.C. Forest Products (1958), 8 L.A.C. 153 (Carrothers) from the
preceding analysis.
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the employees were compulsorily retired with pension, the company's actions
were upheld, these cases can be understood on the bases of both estoppel or a
tacit recognition by the union of the company's power in this area. Admittedly,
the Canadian Car and Foundry case, and the Libby McNeil and Libby case, do
concede that retirement is different than discharge and need not be justified, but
one cannot fathom their reasoning in arriving at such an important conclusion,
and therefore these cases can be properly ignored. Accordingly, our intuitive
response to Bell Canada's substantive claim has remained intact - that clear
and specific wording in a collective agreement should be required before an
employer can terminate an employee without cause and without consent. In
other words, prior to Mr. Justice Judson's few words, there was no clear legal
justification supporting the company's actions as a matter of principle, and
this is what Professor Weiler held. He ruled that compulsory retirement is to
be considered prima facie a discharge. His concluding remarks are worth
reproducing.
There does seem to be a conflict in the arbitration decisions, then, about whether
retirement is a form of discharge, and a decision in this case cannot be made on the
basis of any consensus in the precedents. It must instead rest on a judgment about the
substantive merits of the contrasting positions. When one attempts to fathom the
reasons for the distinction, it is interesting to note the total absence of any argument
made in its favour in the cases which draw it. We are simply told that "retirement"
is different from "discharge" and that is that. It is true that "retirement" is obviously
different from a "lay-off" because in the latter case, what is intended is only a
temporary cessation of active employment, with the employee retaining status as
such under the collective agreement (at least until his seniority rights lapse after an
extended period). Retirement is intended to be a permanent cessation of all employ-
ment rights, both actual and in the future. Ordinarily, in its linguistic sense, we think
of retirement as the voluntary act of a person who decides he no longer wants, or
needs, or is able to work because of his age. There is no doubt of the distinction
between discharge and retirement in this voluntary sense. Compulsory retirement
occurs when an employee is told by the Company he no longer is going to be allowed
to work because of his age, even though he thinks he is able, and still wants, to work.
It is a permanent termination of the employment relationship, against the will of the
employee, and in the interests of the Company, and shares each of these character-
istics with discharge. It is not enough to call this severance by another name -
Retirement - in order to avoid the discharge clause in the Agreement ...
The typical collective agreement clearly shows why compulsory retirement should
be considered, prima facie, to be a form of discharge. An employee's security of
tenure in an on-going firm is ordinarily protected against temporary interruption by
limitations on lay-off or recall or by a suspension. It is ordinarily protected against
permanent interruption by limitations on discharge. From the employee's point of
view, the significance of compulsory retirement appears to be exactly the same as an
admitted discharge. He has lost his job, his seniority rights, and earning opportunities,
permanently, against his will, and because of a Company decision in its own interests
and discretion. Moreover, it is vital to note that in this case, as in many of those
reported, the Company decision to retire is taken only after consideration of the
situation and work-potential of the individual grievor. "Retirement" is not simply
based on the impersonal application of a general rule and instead involves the same
exercise of individualized discretion as takes place in the typical dismissal case ....
Hence, as regards this first issue, which was presented to me as a preliminary objec-
tion relating to arbitrability, I find that compulsory retirement is a "dismissal" and
subject to Article 8 of the Agreement.
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Can one characterize this reasoning as "outrageous?" Is it anything other
07 See, supra, note 31.
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than reasonable? In fact, in light of the previously described plight of older
workers Weiler appears to have been clearly right, and Mr. Justice Laskin's
masterful understatement suggests that he thought so too. In this regard the
pre-eminent Canadian labour arbitrator, before his elevation to the Bench,
wrote:
I repeat my opinion that it was open to an arbitrator to conclude that an employee
should have the benefit of the grievance and arbitration machinery whenever his
employment is terminated, and not be exposed to an arbitrary distinction between
dismissal and retirement based on a unilateral employer policy and on a unilateral
use of language which had never been incorporated into the collective agreement to
make the distinction which is now put forward as being a matter of law.58
If any opinion has to be characterized as "outrageous" or unreasonable,
I would bluntly submit that it must be Mr. Justice Judson's, and so I ask, who
will review the judges? But less presumptuously, the purpose of this comment is
to stress that the courts not equate judicial review with a full appeal on the merits
lest labour artibration's "final and binding" qualities be completely eroded.
Moreover, it is similarly essential that the human qualities of litigation never
be overlooked. The Court had a very important human issue before it - an
aspect of the hardships faced by the older worker. The restraint reflected in the
judgment of Mr. Justice Laskin would have permitted the Court to recognize and
accommodate both the institutional and the human considerations present.
Instead the fate of the older worker now resides entirely with the legislature.
Hopefully, through changing societal attitudes, more progressive social legisla-
tion will provide these people with the legal support they need. It is unfortunate
that the Supreme Court of Canada, a court whose performance should epitomize
the creative capacity of law, failed to take, and possibly failed even to see, an
important step in this direction.
A peasant makes his old father eat out of a small wooden trough, apart from the rest
of the family; one day he finds his son fitting little boards together. "It's for you
when you are old," says the child. Straight away the grandfather is given back his
place at the family table.59
58 ld.
59 De Beauvoir, supra, note 18.
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